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This paper surveys the roots of the modern literature on monetary policy, and illustrates 
the convergence that occurs between open-economy approaches and the micro 
foundations of monetary policy. From the Banking School versus Currency School 
debate to the “credibility versus flexibility” refinement, monetary policy has a long 
history of scholarly works. Although it may be hard to imagine that there is still room for 
innovations, the current developments of the literature on open-economy monetary policy 
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The question of rules versus discretion is at the very heart of the theory of central banking 
and monetary policy. This question has been revived in the recent literature, with leading 
macroeconomists proposing specific policy rules (Bernanke and Mishkin 1997; Taylor 
1993), and utilizing new and diverse analytical tools such as econometrics and game 
theory. This paper presents an overview of the original focus of the literature and 
discusses its evolution into the modern literature that we find today. 
 
In mapping the history of monetary policy literature it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
isolate the exact point at which a new path branches off from the road of theretofore 
conventional thought.  It is always difficult to pinpoint chronologically the origin of new 
paths in the literature, and contemporary scholars have great trouble attributing them 
certain authors. Monetary policy has a long scholarly history and it may be hard to 
imagine that there is still room for the “major” or “radical” innovations referring to the 
Industrial Organization literature. It is also hard to find a field with such a rich past of 
breakthrough ideas: from the Mercantilists to the Physiocrats, from the classical 
economists to Keynes and Friedman, and from the divergence between the study of “what 
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Economic Perspectives 11, 17. is monetary” and “what is real” to Don Patinkin and the first real success with the Theory 
of Value. Though monetary policy has long been studied apart from other fields in 
economics, the birth of the New Classical School in the late 1970s began to close the gap 
between monetary policy and other economic fields. Game theory seems to have played a 
key role in this development. The capacity to model the interactions of central banks, 
governments, and citizens’ expectations (rational or adaptative) allowed a new set of 
literature to grow parallel to that which had been developed via  general equilibrium 
models. With this new literature, the microeconomic approach to macroeconomics was 
born. 
 
This paper reviews the breaking paths of the monetary policy literature since the 
inception of the “rules versus discretion” debate. Section 2 presents the bases of modern 
monetary policy, section 3 treats the New Classical School, will be section 4 surveys the 
modern debate, and section 5 concludes by discussing new avenues of research. 
 2. The Bases of Modern Monetary Policy 
 
The bases of modern monetary policy can be found in the debate initiated by Keynes and 
Friedman over the goals of monetary policy, and the best management of the supply of 
money (Argy 1988; Fischer 1990). We focus herein on the latter debate over which two 
distinct camps of literature emerged: the Keynesians arguing in favour of discretionary 
monetary policies, and the Chicago School advocating monetary policies based on rules.  
In order to find the origin of the “rules versus discretion” debate, however, we must look 
to England and the dissensions between the Currency School and Banking School 
preceding the Peel’s Act of 1844. 
 
Led by David Ricardo, the Currency School stood in favour of rules to govern money 
supply. It did not conceive of bank deposits as money, arguing instead that money is in 
circulation and its quantity fluctuates as if it were gold. Therefore, by definition, the 
balance of payments determines the quantity of currency in circulation.  Imagining that 
central bankers, who were framed by clear and transparent statutes, would set up its 
program, the Currency School approaches recent discussions on the independence of 
central banks. 
 
The Banking School stood on the discretion side of the debate. It held that the evolution 
of the stock of money depended on the movements in the reserves of the Bank of England 
on the one hand, and whether these movements were permanent or transitory on the other. 
Thus, its authors criticized the gold standard rule and defended the idea of discretionary authorities. Nevertheless it proposed an abstract rule for the operations of the Bank of 
England: the “Real Bills doctrine.” Under this rule credit was to be extended at a discount 
only for those invoices whose object was to finance real goods in the course of 
production and distribution. Since this doctrine bound monetary creation to real 
production, monetary creation could never be excessive, i.e. inflationary (Sijben 1990). 
By virtue of the Act of 1844 the Bank of England was separated into two entities, an 
“Issue Department” and a “Banking Department.” The Banking Department functioned 
as a commercial bank, and the Issue Department converted banknotes of England into 
gold or coins according to a precise rule of convertibility: a fiduciary issue of 18 million 
pounds, above which, at the margin, notes were backed by gold reserves at 100%. 
 
With this act, the debate between the Currency School and Banking School turned in 
favour of the former. The Bank of England’s monetary policy followed a simple rule: the 
offer of currency varied according to the gold reserves. Although, notably, the Currency 
School inspired the design of such a rule, the Banking School inspired its implementation.  
Indeed, the functioning of this system required a high degree of discretion on the part of 
British monetary authorities. One illustration of such discretion is the period from 1844 to 
1944. During this time, the Bank of England actively adjusted the discount rate to answer 
for changes in the gold stock (Schaling 1995). Hence, De facto discretion overrode the 
rule. 
 
Almost a century after the rules versus discretion debate began in England, it emerged in 
the United States (1926-1927).  It placed Congress and the Federal Reserve System (Fed) on diametrically opposite sides. Congressman Strong wanted to force the Fed to follow a 
monetary rule aimed at price stability, whereas Miller, the administrator of the Fed, 
privileged monetary discretion based on the “Real Bills doctrine” (Sijben 1990). 
Although the Act of 1913 made price stability the main goal of the Fed, it failed to 
specify the means with which the central bank could advance this goal, leaving 
proponents of discretionary monetary policy with some room to maneuver. As was the 
case in England, the proponents of discretion won the debate, and the independence of 
the Fed was given the full force of the law.  
 
3. The New Classical School’s Motto: Reputation 
 
Several works form the basis of the New Classical School (Lucas 1972; Sargent and 
Wallace 1975). From its roots two main trends appear: first, the analysis of the Phillips 
curve in the light of the assumption of rational anticipations; and second, the question of 
the monetary origin of inflation. One of the main results of these two previous changes in 
assumptions is that unemployment deviates from its natural rate only if there are random 
deviations in the offer of currency compared to its systematic component. 
 
Since Lucas (1972), the “New Classical School” has defended the idea that discretionary 
monetary policy cannot produce long-lasting effects on output and employment. 
Discretionary monetary policy is ineffective due to the formation of rational expectations 
by economic agents assumed. Accordingly, the “rules versus discretion” debate was 
tipped towards the rule side. Yet, the natural rate of unemployment theory was not enough to shake the Keynesian structure. Though it denied the effectiveness of monetary 
policy in the long-run, it did not question the relative efficacy of monetary policy in the 
short-run. 
 
In 2004, Nobel prizes were given to Kydland and Prescott (1977) who developed the 
notion of “time inconsistency.” This notion captures the existence of a temptation for a 
central bank looking to maximize total surplus by not to respecting ex post its own ex 
ante monetary objectives; that agents have rational expectations vis-à-vis this temptation 
creates an inflationary bias. In other words, the possibility that monetary authorities will 
not respect their own commitments reduces the confidence that economic agents have in 
these individuals, and this backlash undermines money supply control. 
 
Why would a government use the monetary policy to deceive agents’ expectations? The 
answer is twofold. Firstly, it can change its policy for reasons such as an adjustment to 
asymmetric economic shocks. Secondly, it can do so for reasons involving the political 
business cycle (Nordhaus 1975). When important elections are approaching, the 
government may want to falsify agents’ expectations in order to give a short run impetus 
to economic activity, in order to benefit politically from the fruits of the welfare 
improvement that follows. 
 
Being the result of a lack of confidence, the inflationary bias spawned the creation of a 
new notion: “credibility.” The debate shifted course with the introduction of this concept. 
Indeed, several authors, since Barro and Gordon (1983) wonder about alternative ways to develop the credibility of a central bank, while maintaining the option to stabilize the 
economy in the case of an exogenous shock. Barro and Gordon (1983) were the first 
authors to explain that the degree of confidence in the central bank is relevant for 
economic agents when they form their expectations about future inflation.  
 
Several different delegation schemes have been reviewed by Woodford (1999) to 
introduce inertia into the discretionary side. Inspired by the new set of questions raised by 
the notion of credibility, Rogoff (1985) proposed the appointment of a “conservative 
central banker who is more risk averse to inflation than the average economic agent. Thus 
agents would not consider signals sent by the central bank at the beginning of a period to 
be “cheap talk.” Rogoff’s model has created the momentum for the modern theory of 
central banks. While the best known example of such monetary policy delegation is the 
appointment of a conservative central banker (Clarida, Gali and Gertler 1999; Rogoff 
1985; Svensson 1997), Neumann (1991) pushes the literature in a direction of even 
greater emphasis toward institutional design. He insists on the advantages of having an 
independent central bank. In such a case, the inflationist bias would almost disappear, and 
the central bank would have the ability to stabilize the economy in the case of an 
economic shock via well-suited monetary policy  
 
However, some authors challenge the advantages of an independent central bank. By 
definition, the purpose of an independent central bank is separation from political power, 
and thus, the central banker is the only authority in terms of monetary decisions. But is 
monetary omnipotence beneficial for the currency?   
Inspired by Industrial Organization literature, Fratianni and Huang (1995) and Waller 
(1995) apply agency theory to the relationship between a central banker and citizens. The 
president or governor of a central bank is the agent and the citizens are principals vis-à-
vis the central bank. Like stockholders, citizens are interested in the central bank 
producing the best currency possible, i.e. properly adjusted to their aggregate demand for 
money. The central banker’s goal is to improve his/her utility function. Agency theory 
holds that there may be an incompatibility between the objective of the best currency 
possible and the personal utility function of the manager. In order to prevent an 
expansionary monetary policy, a control procedure could be implemented forcing the 
central banker to commit to the stability of the value of the money. Here too, the rule 
dominates discretion. 
 
Another trend in the institutional design literature focuses on “performance contracts” 
(Walsh 1995). A performance contract is an incentive given by the government to the 
central banker to abide by his/her policy announcements. This incentive can be a salary 
premium which the central banker receives at the end of the period if he or she achieves 
the goals stated at the beginning of the period. 
 
Lohmann (1992) exemplifies the set of rule-side literature focused on institutional design. 
She proposes a rule-based mechanism, and argues that Milton Friedman’s proposal of the 
“k% rule” could be revisited in light of this new literature. The intuition was that because all agents know the rule, and integrate the inflation forecast into their salary contracts, the 
option to use the monetary policy to stabilize the economy is almost non-existent. 
 
The literature also proposed that instruments could be used to enhance central bank 
credibility. An oft-discussed proposal is based upon quantities—relating the supply of 
money to the economic growth rate or changes in the demand for monetary aggregates 
such as M1, M2 or M4. Along this line, central banks offer several reasons for 
monitoring the developments of monetary aggregates. First, money may be an indicator 
of future inflation. Second, money can have an informational role if it is related to other 
variables that determine inflation but are imperfectly observed. Third, money is closely 
related to credit, and should, thus, be an important part of the credit channel of monetary 
transmission. The European Central Bank, for example, gives money a prominent role in 
its implementation of monetary policy by keeping a reference value of 4.5% for the 
growth rate of M3. Lately, however, the widely accepted narrow monetary aggregate 
band has been challenged by new policies, e.g. the interest rate.  
 
In practice, the interest rate that major central banks adjust is the overnight rate on the 
interbank lending which banks use to meet reserve requirements. Taylor (1993) ignited 
the discussion of simple interest rules by showing that the rule provided a good 
description of inflation for the period between 1987-1992. The Taylor rule calls for the 
gradual adjustment of inflation to its target: it responds to lagged inflation. A modern 
version of the Taylor rule is based on forward-looking expectations where policy 
responds to expected inflation (Clarida, Gali and Gertler 1997), and changes have also been made such as considering an interest rate smoothing objective (Woodford 1999). 
Other targets, such as a target for nominal income growth (Jensen 2002) and a target for 
change in the output gap (Walsh 2003), are also discussed in the literature. 
 
Simple rules for targets (as opposed to instruments) have also been proposed, Inflation 
targeting has received a lot of attention (Bernanke and Mishkin 1997), and all of the 
leading real-world proposals call for gradual convergence of inflation to target. 
Sometimes this proposal takes the form of a target for average inflation over several 
periods (Nessen and Vestin 2005). In other cases it is associated with a role for money 
(Soderstrom 2005). Since the anchor is explicitly in terms of inflation, this policy avoids 
the potential problems of instability associated with alternatives, e.g. money growth 
anchors, that are only indirectly linked to inflation. Finally, inflation targets may instil 
increased credibility in commitments to maintaining low inflation, while allowing for 
some flexibility in the short-run (Clarida, Gali and Gertler 1999). 
 
 
4. The modern debate: Credibility versus flexibility 
 
The early stages of the modern debate have been associated with a change in the 
methodological approach. Inspired by the reputation concepts developed in the Industrial 
Organization literature, the founding papers of the new trend in the monetary policy 
literature use game theory as a primary tool (Barro and Gordon 1983; Backus and Driffill 
1985; Canzoneri 1985) It is, thus, no surprise to see the debate branch out in new directions. New methodologies have transformed the “rules versus discretion” debate into 
a “credibility versus flexibility” debate. Canzoneri introduces the concept of private 
information between agents and the central bank, where the central bank has information 
that agents do not. Canzoneri explains that when agents integrate an inflationist bias into 
their expectations, the central bank has a real interest in cheating; the equilibrium occurs 
via a non-cooperative strategy. Therefore, unless the central bank is forced to remain in 
the cooperative equilibrium, the inflationist bias always exists. 
 
In retrospect, until the late 1990s, the methodology used to study the inflationist bias 
(Barro and Gordon 1983; Backus and Driffill 1985; Canzoneri 1985; or Fratianni and 
Waller 1995) was oriented towards a rule of monetary production rather than 
discretionary intervention by the central bank. Indeed, this literature stressed the 
importance of monetary authorities continuing to play a key role, not only with respect to 
the rule, but also with respect to market intervention in the case of exogenous shocks. As 
had been the historical dialectic of the literature, the discretion side was revived by many 
authors who showed that discretionary policy-making in a world with forward-looking 
agents is characterized by a “stabilization bias” (Svensson 1997; Woodford 1999). 
 
5. The “Post-modern” Classical School: Credibility versus Flexibility in an Open-
Economy Context 
 
The debate that led to the birth of the New Classical School had always taken place in a 
closed-economy setting. The latest version of the rules versus discretion debate is credibility versus flexibility, but even this development does not address the open 
economy context. For instance, at the international level a rule of thumb may be that to 
avoid destabilizing economic policies, national monetary policy must be linked to a 
stable international monetary system through a fixed but adjustable exchange rate 
mechanism. This would help strike the fine balance between credibility and flexibility. 
When there is no economic shock a country will import low inflation from the 
international system, but in case of a shock the country keeps enough latitude to absorb it 
via expansionary monetary policy. 
 
Unsurprisingly the open-economy exchange rate literature has developed parallel to the 
creation and expansion of the New Classical School. For instance, the study of exchange 
rate mechanisms has closely accompanied the literature on optimal currency areas 
(Mundell 1961). Consideration of the exchange regime is essential since it may constrain 
the central bank.  
 
While it should seem obvious that the gap between the open-economy framework and the 
New Classical School must be bridged, such work is at the forefront of monetary policy 
literature. The international context in which national monetary policy evolves must be 
included in the study of the credibility of a central bank. First, it is the question of 
comparing one central bank to another bank to measure the impact of a lack of credibility 
on the exchange rates. Second, it is necessary to consider the exchange rates by 
themselves.  
 Some authors have begun to work in this direction. It is interesting to note that the new 
integrated approach has started with the European economic integration. De Grauwe 
(1992) uses a methodology close to Barro and Gordon (1983) to measure differences in 
terms of credibility between two countries of the European Union. Martin (1996) 
includes exchange rates in a model built upon the assumptions drawn from Barro and 
Gordon (1983) in order to respond to the precise question of whether exclusion from the 
euro zone is relevant for exchange rates. 
 
It is also interesting to ask how the open economy changes the strategies of players, and 
whether this impacts exchange rates. We can imagine a large risk premium for a currency 
on the world market if it lacks credibility. From there, it is possible to determine criteria 
according to which an exchange rate regime is more credible than another. To this end, 
Herrendorf (1999) begins another new path in the literature. He develops a reputation 
model with information asymmetries in an open economy setting and finds that, due to 
the instability created by asymmetric information, flexible exchange rates are inferior to 
fixed regimes. With the birth of the Economic and Monetary Union, as well as 
discussions centered on new monetary unions, these questions are particularly relevant.  
 
In both fixed and flexible exchange rate mechanisms, an inflationist bias is prevalent. The 
realization conditions, and conditions for the success of a monetary union, must be 
analysed using the inflationist bias concept. If a country is part of a fixed exchange rate 
regime, its credibility is not reliant upon its decisions. If it is part of a flexible exchange rate mechanism, integration into a fixed exchange rate zone is a means to improved 
credibility (Herrendorf 1999; Melitz 1988). 
 
It is indeed appropriate that the forefront of monetary policy literature leaves off where 
we currently find ourselves vis-à-vis the global and increasingly interdependent world 
environment. The stakes are high, as the European Economic and Monetary Union has 
become an example for Mercosur, Africa, and North America.  It is difficult to say where 
and when new paths will emerge in the monetary policy literature, but assuredly, there 
will be many more.  As we know from the transformation of the classical “rules versus 
discretion” debate, to the modern “credibility versus flexibility” debate, radical 
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